

Module 13

Protracted Theft Analysis



Learning Objective

- Recognize situations/opportunities for protracted theft strategies
- Review methodology for analysis of protracted theft
- Apply methodology to URF



Material Accounting (MA) systems provide delayed detection capability against protracted theft

- MA systems may not be effective for prompt detection of abrupt theft
- Bulk material inventory differences exceeding acceptable limits or a discrete item not in its authorized location when needed for processing may provide *delayed* detection
- Need to take into account
 - Measurement errors
 - Timing of protracted theft activities and subsequent MA activities
 - Potential insider subversion of or tampering with MA safeguards
 - Potential differences in effectiveness of subsequent MA activities if the first occurrence failed to detect theft





Alternative protracted theft strategies and protection elements must be examined

	Step	Strategies	Protection elements	
1	Acquire target protracted	5 acquisitions	Access and material control	
		1,000 g each	Physical Inventory	
			Process Monitoring	
		10 acquisitions 500 g each 1 day each	Access and material control	
			Physical Inventory	
			Process Monitoring	
		20 acquisitions 250 g each 1 day each	Access and material control	
			Physical Inventory	
			Process Monitoring	
2	Remove	ECP	Personnel entry/exit	
	from MAA	Clean waste	Confirmatory check	
		Rad waste	NDA measurement	
3	Remove from PA	ECP	Personnel entry/exit	

Three Primary Detection Opportunities for Protracted Theft Scenarios

1. Detect during each acquisition of material

- Access control (e.g., badge reader)
- Material control (e.g., two person rule)
- 2. Detect reduction in inventory during scenario
 - Periodic physical inventory taking, process calls or material transfer checks may reveal absence of material
 - Material transfers could be within MBA, between MBAs or off site

3. Detect during illicit removal from site

- Material control (e.g., material transfer forms)
- Access control (e.g., fence and other physical barriers)
- Physical protection (e.g., radiation portal monitors)

Three Phases Of Protracted Theft Can Be Detected With PP, MC And MA Systems



PP – physical protection, MC – material control, MA – material accounting

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Specify The Parameters Of The Protracted Theft Scenario

- Insider access, knowledge and authority determines P_d during acquisition
- 2. Timing of acquisitions time required for each acquisition, time interval between acquisitions, number required for goal quantity
- 3. Accumulation area
- 4. Timing of exit activities time for each exit, number of exits, time interval between exits



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Specify Material Accounting Activities

- Inventory and production schedules
 - Inventory sampled or required for production (%)
 - Time between inventories or process calls – scheduled or average time between random inventories
- Effectiveness
 - P_d for each insider type may be small or zero if the insider is responsible for conducting inventories or maintaining records
 - P_d for first inventory
 - P_d for each subsequent inventory overall probability of detection will increase over time as more material is diverted

Define Material	Accounting	Activities				
Name Daily check	<u> </u>					
Time interval in	1.00	Activity is O Scheduled © Random				
Target location						
OPN-Can on shelf						
Personnel SI Operator Health Physics Maintenance	Pd 1: 0.20 0.20 0.20	st Pd 21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20	nd •			
Production Super	1 0.20	2 0.20]			
ок	C	ancel				
ASSESS Screenshot						

Trend Analysis Is Used To Detect A Protracted Theft Attempts



- Use cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistical tests
 - Sum likelihoods of observed inventory differences (ID) assuming normal material unaccounted for distribution
 - ID distribution may have negative mean caused by process hold up
 - Variance of ID distribution may change due to equipment modifications or environmental variables
 - Initiate alarm when sum exceeds threshold
 - Or change in slope
 - Or sequence of points near alarm limit
 - Or change in process variance
- For a sequence of two IDs
 - ID₁ = PB₁ PE₁ + X₁ Y₁
 - $ID_2 = PB_2 PE_2 + X_2 Y_2$
 - Do not expect successive IDs to be independent (PE₁ = PB₂)

EWMA Or CUSUM Statistical Tests Typically Used For Trend Analysis

- Inventory difference drifts down during protracted theft
- Measurements have error distributions shown
- Probability of detection may change over time



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Protracted Theft Scenario Analysis Incorporates PP, MC And MA Factors

- Acquisition and exit events
 - Use abrupt theft techniques
- Material accounting system
 - Compute cumulative probability of detection during protracted theft timeline
- Overall probability of detection for scenario is:



$$P_{d} = 1 - (1-P_{da})^{n} \times (1-P_{d}(t))^{i} \times (1-P_{de})^{m}$$
Avoid detection
during n
acquisitions
Avoid detection
periods
Avoid detection
during m exits

• Perform for each adversary, location and scenario Module 13 -11



Summary Of Protracted Theft Analysis Steps

- Define alternative protracted theft scenarios (number of acquisitions, staging area, exit attempts and timing of each)
- 2. Identify layers and physical protection elements that would detect acquisitions and exits
- 3. Identify material accounting elements that would detect missing or staged materials
- 4. Identify alternative strategies for each insider action
- 5. Evaluate effectiveness of each element against each insider action
- 6. Choose best strategy at each layer



Exercise: Estimate Pd For Alternative Protracted Theft Scenarios

	Step	Strategies	Protection elements	Pda	Pd(t)	Ре
1	Acquire target protracted	5 acquisitions 1,000 g each 1 day each	Access/matl. control			
			Physical Inventory			
			Process Monitoring			
		10 acquisitions 500 g each 1 day each	Access/matl. control			
			Physical Inventory			
			Weekly trending			
		20 acquisitions 250 g each 1 day each	Access/matl. control			
			Physical Inventory			
			Process Monitoring			
2	Remove from MAA	ECP	Personnel entry/exit			
		Clean waste	Confirmatory check			
		Rad waste	NDA measurement			
3	Remove from PA	ECP	Personnel entry/exit			